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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BEEHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
Plavntiff-Respondent,

vs.
DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE
ROSQUIST, and ILA R. PAINTER,
individuals, and CARPETS INC., a·
corporation,
Defendants,

Case No. 11951

SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,
FRED L. PAINTER,
Intervener-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
There is no substantial disagreement between appellant and respondent as to the evidence or facts in this
case. The appeal therefore can be disposed of on issues
of law. As to these
respondent argues that the
decisions of this court in the former appeal of this case,
21Utah2d 17, 439 Pac. 2d 468 and the later case.of Contim.ental Bank & Trust Company v. Kimball, 21Utah2d 152,
442 Pac. 2d 472, establish a rule that if parties enter into
a contract ostensibly creating a joint tenancy relationship
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with full right of survivorship there arises a
that such is the case u.nless and until some interested
party shows under equitable rules that the contract should
be reformed to show some other agreement of the parties
or that the contract is not enforceable because of fraud
'
mistake incapacity or other infirmity. Respondent quotes
language to this effect from the Court's opinion on the
former appeal, and then argues that here the appellant
made no attempt to reform the contract or to present any
evideni:;e of fraud, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity,
and that appellant must therefore fail in his claim to the
joint deposit account.

This argument calls for consideration of the law of
co-tenancy in general and joint tenancy in particular. It
calls for study of the language of the bank signature card. ·
That card does not specify the respective contributions
of the depositors nor the fractional shares to which they
will be entitled in case of controversy between themselves.
Respondent's argument therefore calls for answer
to the question: What presumption is created by the
language of the bank signature card 1 Is it not merely
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the depositiors are presumed to have contributed equally to the
joint deposit
What other presumption arises!
Is it that the narties intended to created a right of sur·
vivorship? That is expressly stated in tile contract, therefore no presumption is called for as to that. But since
the appellant is the survivor of the joint tenancy he is
clearly the beneficiary of that part of the agreement,
whether it is referred to as creating a presumption or as
an express contract.
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Respondent relies on the fact that appellant did not
attempt to reform the contract or to present evidence
to show fraud, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity.
Why should appellant ask for reformation of the contract 1 Why should he try to prove fraud or mistake when
the contract by its terms gives him, as asurvivor of the
joint tenancy, the entire fund!
These signature cards are furnished by the banks to
protect their interests. They specifically provide that the
bank is protected in case of withdrawal by either of the
joint depositors. But there is nothing on the signature
card to show the contributions made by the respective
parties or to specify their respective shares in the ownership of the fund. In case of an inter vivos controversy between depositors there is a presumption, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that they contributed equally.
But this is a presumption, and nothing more. As stated by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y.
380, 167 N.E. 506, 512, 66 A.L.R. 870
"the plain implication is that as between the depositors themselves, the form of the deposit gives
rise to a presumption and nothing more, but after
the death of either, leaving a deposit then subsisting, the presumption becomes conclusive as to the
title of the survivor."
This statement by Mr. Justice Cardozo is quoted in the
opinion of the Court on the former appeal of this case,
and also in other Utah cases cited in appellant's former
brief. It seems however to have been given no consideration by counsel for respondent in their brief.
Furthermore, in relying upon th ecase of Continental
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Bank and Tru:::;t Company r. Kimball (i:m.pra), respondent
fails to state tlmt the surviving joint ternrnt was there
awarded. the fund and that the Court held that the administrn.tor of the estate of the deceased joint tenant was
conchisively bound by the language of the contract creat.
in.<1 a right of survivorship.

Responden.t dwells u1wn the statPment in the opinion:
'1.Since the appellant is not trying to reform
contract 1 and is not claiming fraud, mistake,
incapacity) or other infirmity) we think it is COD·
elusively bound hy the contract as made and can.
not show that the parties intended a result COD·
trary to that which the law of joint tenancy rela.
tionsr.ip imposes."
But that language was addressed to an appellant administrator of the estate of the non-survivor of the joint ten·
ancy.

In this case the appellant is the survivor of the joint
tPnancy which ex1ffessly created a right of survivorship.
He can claim under the contract. He had no need for
reformation or to plead mistake or fraud.
Referring now to the presumption of equal contribu·
tions to the joint de:)osit, no statute or any rule of law
required ap1)ellant to prove otherwise than by a pre·
pond.erance of the evidence that his wife, Ila, had not
made any contribution to the deposit.
The prt>surnption that she had contributed to the
deposit ceased to have any effect when evidence was presented as to the facts and circumstances.
"Whe:-ever the facts or circmnstances are shown
concernfog which the presumption is
the presumption ceases and the controversy, is to
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be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced."
Ryan v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 46 Ut. 530,
151Pac.71
Furthermore if the Court should think to indulge a preswnption that the appellant intended his deposits in the
joint account to be gifts to his wife, there is no statute
or rule of law which requires anything more than a preponderance of the evidence to overcome· such presumption. Here, the appellant testified that he established the
joint account for convenience in paying household expenses and to give his wife ownership of the balance remaining in the fund in case she survived him. That testimony stands wholly uncontradicted. Likewise
that the wife is now decerused.
Appellant submits that the trial court and counsel
for respondent have misinterpreted the opinion of the
court on the former appeal herein and have given no effect to that part of the opinion wherein this Court said:
"The courts usually hold that a judgment c:reditor's
rights are limited to the amount of the funds in the
p.ccount equitably owned by the debtor depositor
and do not extend to funds equitably owned by the
other depositor. Thus the view has been expressed
that if the evidence shows that the depositors have
an equal right to the funds in the joint account,
a garnishing creditor of oM of them may recover
one-half of the moneys in such account. . .. "
Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist (supra) page
469.
Also, respondent and the trial court failed to give effect to the direction of this Court:
"The interest of Ila R. Painter in and to the fund
while she was alive, if any she had, should be
5

applied toward satisfaction of appellant's judgment against her." (Italics supplied)
Appellant further submits that both the trial court

and respondent have failed to give effect to the rule established by former decisions of this Court referred to in
appellant's former brief and have relied entirely upon
statements of the court to the effect that the recitals in
a bank signature card cannot be contradicted or overcome
except by proof of fraud, mistake, incapacity, etc. Rec
spondent has failed to differentiate between a situation
where a survivor of a joint tenancy is standing upon
his right as a survivor and the case where an administra- .
tor or executor of adeceased joint tenant is claiming
against a surviving joint tenant. When the Utah cases are
studied with due regard to such distinction, it is clear
that the appellant here in is entitled to prevail and without
any reformation of the contract or any proof of fraud,
mistake, incapacity or other infirmity. Appellant can ,
claim under the express language of the contract - and
that too whether the foTmer rule of Holt v. Bayles, 85
Utah 364, 39 Pac. 2d 715, or the later rule of Tangren vs.
Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 Pac. 2d 179 is followed. It is
unnecessary in this case to attempt a reconciliation of
those cases or to choose between the conflicting views ex·
pressed in the majority and minority opinions. The appellant here is entitled to recover regardless of which
view is followed. He is the survivor of the joint tenancy.
He was the sole contributor to the fund. He can claim
under either right. The rights are not inconsistent.
Appellant repeats what was said in his former brief:
"The cases dealing with the question are harmoni·
6

ous in holding that a wife's creditor has no right
to levy against a bank account maintained jointly
in the names of husband and wife but in which
all of the funds belonged to the husband."
11 ALR 3d 1487
(Citing U.S. vs. Third National Bank & Trust
Co., 111 F. Supp. 152.)
Appellant again asserts that it will have far-reaching
evil consequences if this Court should hold that a creditor
of one of two or more persons shown as owners of a joint
bank account with right to survivorship may levy by
garnishment or attachment or execution against such
bank account, regardless of equitable rights of the depositors and regardless of the right of survivorship to which
they have in writing agreed.
Respectfully submitted,

WILL L. HOYT
Attorney for IntervenerAppellant
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